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Abstract 
This paper reports the results of research on whether changes in Department of Defense 
(DoD) acquisition policy and process have had a discernible effect on the growth of Program 
Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) of major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs). Examination 
of PAUC growth data for 151 MDAPs that passed Milestone II or B during fiscal year (FY) 
1970–FY 2007 does not reveal any substantial or consistent effect of changes in acquisition 
policy and process. Changes in funding climate, however, are found to have a large influence 
on PAUC growth. These findings have three implications for acquisition reform. First, the 
relevant context for understanding PAUC growth is the interface between the acquisition 
process and the program/funding process. Second, it seems unlikely that further changes in 
the acquisition process will have a major effect on PAUC growth. Third, the underlying cause 
of persistent high PAUC growth is not, as is commonly asserted, a deeply established culture 
of the DoD acquisition organizations and their professional employees. 
Introduction 
This paper reports the results of research on whether changes in Department of 
Defense (DoD) acquisition policy and process have had a discernible effect on the growth of 
Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) of major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs).1 A 
few previous studies have broached this topic, but it has received little attention, and the 
work that has been done has not resulted in any accepted or even widely recognized 
conclusions.2  
                                            
 
 
1 The text of this paper is substantially identical to that of David L. McNicol and Linda Wu (2014), 
Evidence on the Effect of DoD Acquisition Policy and Process on Cost Growth of Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs. The appendices of P-5126 and its associated data CD are not included here, 
however. A PDF version of the paper is available at 
https://www.ida.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/Publications/IDA_Documents/CARD/P-5126.ashx. To 
obtain a hard copy, contact IDA Library Reference Services at (703) 845-2087 or refdesk@ida.org. A 
summary of P-5126 is included in Defense Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? (2014). 
 
2 The literature includes many analyses of particular acquisition policies. There also have been 
several largely qualitative studies of, for example, the extent to which a set of related initiatives has 
been successful or, to offer another example, the apparent successes and shortcomings of the 
acquisition process over a specific time period, such as a decade. In contrast, there have been few 
broad quantitative assessments of the effectiveness of acquisition policy and process. The main 
predecessors of this work, in particular, are David L. McNicol (2005), Cost Growth in Major Weapon 
Procurement Programs, 2nd ed., especially pages 41–44 and 55–59, and Tyson et al. (1992), in The 
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The establishment of the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) in 
late fiscal year (FY) 1969 marks the start of systematic Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) oversight of MDAPs. While an initiative of then Deputy Secretary of Defense David 
Packard, the DSARC responded to intense congressional concerns with growth in the costs 
of major DoD weapon system acquisition programs. It appears to have generally been 
regarded at the time as a successful innovation. 
There have been many changes, large and small, in DoD acquisition policy and 
process since the DSARC was established. Many of these were undertaken simply for 
reasons of good government—to reduce the costs of the decision-making process and the 
time it requires, to increase its transparency, to make it more responsive to policy direction, 
and to adapt it to changes in the technological and national security environment. Many 
others were aimed directly at improving outcomes on MDAPs—in particular, reducing cost 
growth. This study was undertaken in the hope that a better understanding of the effects of 
these changes in acquisition policy and process on PAUC growth will contribute to the long-
running discussion of reform of the DoD acquisition process. 
Finding or making estimates of PAUC growth for a sufficiently large set of MDAPs 
was the first major challenge faced by this study. We have a PAUC growth estimate for 151 
of the 309 distinct MDAPs that filed at least one SAR during FY 1969– FY 2007, a bit less 
than half of the total. The programs for which we have a PAUC growth estimate do not 
include any of the approximately 75 MDAPs that were terminated with little or no production. 
It would be interesting to have a reasonable PAUC growth estimate relative to the Milestone 
(MS) II/B3 baseline for these programs, but developing such estimates would require far 
more resources than were available for this study. The study, then, does not provide a 
comprehensive picture of cost growth; doing so was not its intent. The question asked is 
whether changes in acquisition policy and process over time have visibly had an influence 
on PAUC growth. We ask that question for MDAPs that passed MS II/B as Acquisition 
Category (ACAT) I programs and progressed into full rate production. The question is not 
explored for programs that were cancelled or truncated. 
Appendix A of McNicol and Wu (2014) describes the sources of the PAUC growth 
estimates used and puts the MDAPs for which a PAUC growth estimate was available in the 
context of the entire population of MDAPs. The paper also provides the data we used on a 
compact disc (CD). Unless stated otherwise, PAUC growth here means PAUC growth 
normalized to the MS II/B baseline quantity.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
 
 
Effects of Management Initiatives on the Costs and Schedules of Defense Acquisition Programs, Vol. 
I: Main Report. More recently, Obaid Younossi et al. (2007), in Is Weapon System Cost Growth 
Increasing? A Quantitative Assessment of Completed and Ongoing Programs, concluded from their 
careful study of trends in development cost growth that “despite the many acquisition reform and 
other DoD management initiatives over the years, the development cost growth of military systems 
has not been reduced.” (Summary page xx). References to the previous literature are provided in 
both McNicol and Younossi. 
3 DoDI 5000.2 issued Oct. 23, 2000, formally established Milestones A, B, and C (in place of 
Milestones I, II, and III) as the main decision points for an MDAP. Milestones A, B, and C began to be 
used somewhat earlier for new programs, however. 
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The second major challenge was one of research design. In broad outline, the paper 
identifies natural experiments that may shed some light on the effects of acquisition policy 
on PAUC growth and then interprets the outcomes of those experiments. In part, this is 
straightforward. We know when the main changes in acquisition policy and process 
occurred and what they were. The overall DoD acquisition funding climate in various 
periods—the second main element of the natural experiment—also can be readily 
established. The problem is that, in addition to the easily identified elements of the natural 
experimental design, there are a considerable number of other factors that had some 
influence on PAUC growth. We first limit attention to acquisition regime and funding climate 
and then, as particular results are stated, ask whether they are compromised by the 
omission of other factors. 
Building Blocks 
Discussions of acquisition reform over the past 25 years have usually put DoD 
program manager (PM) and personnel in the program office in the foreground. These people 
oversee the contractors and do a myriad of things that must be done by the government for 
a major acquisition program to move forward—contracting, financial management, and test 
planning, among many others. In the background are the contractors who typically do the 
development and manufacturing. A good program will not occur if the government personnel 
and contractors do not do their jobs well. It is equally true that if these individuals and 
organizations do their jobs well, a good outcome for the program is more likely. 
What this focus on the DoD PM, the program office personnel, and the contractors’ 
PMs and workers leaves out are factors they must accept as “givens.” These givens are 
subject to changes—sometimes large and fairly sudden—that presumably have substantial 
consequences for program outcomes. One of the givens is the topline DoD funding 
constraint, which does not determine, but generally has a marked influence on, the funding 
for individual MDAPs. A second is DoD acquisition policy and process. We begin with the 
latter.  
Acquisition Regimes 
This paper distinguishes five successive DoD acquisition regimes:4 
1. The Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC), 1970–1982 
2. The Post-Carlucci Initiatives DSARC, 1983–19895  
3. The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), 1990–1993 
4. Acquisition Reform (AR), 1994–2000 
                                            
 
 
4 The main reference we have used is J. Ronald Fox (2011), Defense Acquisition Reform, 1960 to 
2009: An Elusive Goal. Fox identifies the main features of each of these periods as well as the most 
important changes that took place within them. 
 
5 After then Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci. There is some uncertainty about when the 
Post-Carlucci Reforms DSARC should end and the DAB regime should begin. The relevant statutes 
were passed in 1986, and the DAB began functioning under that name in late FY 1987 or early FY 
1988; however, the DoD did not implement the full set of reforms required by statute until 1990. We 
have for that reason set the line at 1990. 
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5. The DAB–Post Acquisition Reform, 2001–2007 (because our PAUC growth 
data ends in 2007) 
The transition from the first phase of the DSARC (1970–1982) to the second was 
principally a matter of policy direction and renewal. The 34 Carlucci Initiatives (regime 
number 2) were intended to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the OSD acquisition 
oversight process and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). While 
the DAB (number 3) itself bears a strong family resemblance to the DSARC, the statute 
creating it directed management changes intended to strengthen what is now the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]). This statute 
also created the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) and directed 
a new requirements process centered on the VCJCS. The results sought by AR (number 4) 
were improvements in MDAP outcomes, but changes made during that period (not all part of 
AR) somewhat relaxed OSD oversight of MDAPs. There were, in particular, substantial cuts 
in acquisition staffs at both the OSD level and Service Headquarters level, and senior 
decision-makers took a more permissive attitude towards cost growth. The Post-AR regime 
(number 5) was marked by the arrival of a new administration in January 2001, which 
brought policy changes but no major changes to the acquisition process or statutes.  
Table 1 displays the average PAUC growth for MDAPs that passed MS II/B or filed a 
first SAR in each of these successive regimes. There are a number of interesting aspects to 
these data, for example, the high PAUC growth during the AR period and the lower PAUC 
growth for FY 2001–FY 2007. Granting that, the single most notable feature of these data is 
the absence of any trend in PAUC growth. If changes in acquisition policy and process have 
had a sustained influence on PAUC growth, it does not show up in this table.  
 Average PAUC Growth in Successive Acquisition Regimes 
 
In constructing Table 1, we assigned the PAUC growth of each program to the 
acquisition regime in place when the program passed MS II/B or filed its first SAR. At first 
glance this may seem dubious, since a program can easily take 10 or 15 years from the start 
of Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) through delivery of the final 
production lot and thus spend parts of its acquisition cycle under successive acquisition 
regimes. Note, however, that our estimates are of PAUC growth measured from the baseline 
established at MS II/B, which does not change over the course of a program’s acquisition 
cycle. It remains possible that the actual acquisition costs of a program are significantly 
influenced by policy or process changes made after its MS II/B. Evidence presented in 
Appendix B of McNicol and Wu (2014) suggests that if such influences exist, they are much 
smaller than the effect of the cost estimate in the MS II/B baseline.  
Broadly, there are two ways to explain the absence of sustained effects of acquisition 
policy and process on the PAUC growth data. First, they may in fact not have a strong or 
consistent effect on PAUC growth. Second, acquisition policy and process may have 
substantial effects that are masked by some other factor or factors.  
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Funding Climate 
Thinking along the lines of the second of these possibilities led to consideration of 
whether changes in the DoD acquisition funding climate might be associated with PAUC 
growth. We have a PAUC growth estimate for 151 MDAPs that passed MS II/B or submitted 
a first SAR during FY 1969–FY 2007. This period includes two sub-periods during which 
acquisition funding was Relatively Constrained: FY 1970–FY 1980 and FY 1987–FY 2002. 
We also have two sub-periods in which the acquisition funding climate was Relatively 
Accommodating: FY 1981–FY 1986 and FY 2003–FY 2007. (We did not include any 
program not at least five years beyond MS II/B, and the 2012 SARs were the last available 
for this study.)6 
Table 2 displays the average PAUC growth data for these four sub-periods. The 
average PAUC growth in periods of Relatively Constrained acquisition funding is far larger 
than it is in periods of a Relatively Accommodating funding climate—by a factor of three in 
the first comparison and by a factor of seven in the second. 
 Average PAUC Growth During Different Acquisition Funding Climates 
 
What the data in Table 2 portray goes well beyond “budget instability” as usually 
understood. Budget instability is a term of art for changes in MDAP funding through the 
annual resourcing cycle and “taxes.” Budget instability is a chronic condition, present to 
some degree in all periods. What this paper observed is a recurring pattern—that MDAPs 
that passed MS II/B during periods when the acquisition funding was Relatively Constrained, 
on average, had much higher PAUC growth than those that passed MS II/B during periods 
of a Relatively Accommodating funding climate. 
Statistical Results 
Table 3 expands Table 2 by replacing the funding climate sub-periods with the 
acquisition policy and process regimes. This table provides results for two sets of natural 
experiments. First, the PAUC growth columns give the effect of changes in the acquisition 
regime for a given funding climate. Second, the rows show the effect of funding climate for a 
given acquisition regime. For example, the first 11 years of the DSARC (FY 1970–FY 1980) 
                                            
 
 
6 We use as the breakpoints that define these periods events that marked major changes in 
expectations about the course of defense spending: (1) the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet 
Union in December 1979 (FY 1980), which about a month later led President Carter to announce a 
policy of sustained increases in defense spending starting with the FY 1981 funding; (2) the adoption 
in December 1985 (end of the first quarter of FY 1986) of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, the 
funding constraints of which effectively ended the Carter–Reagan defense buildup; and (3) the 
9/11/2001 attacks. It is important to recognize that key decisions made within the DoD on content, 
costing, and funding for particular MDAPs in a given year are made at least a year in advance of the 
submission of the funding for that year to the Congress. Consequently, the DoD decisions in funding 
submissions reflect expectations about the climate that submission will encounter. 
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were in a tight funding climate, while the next two (FY 1981–FY 1982) were in a period in 
which the acquisition funding climate was Relatively Accommodating.  
The two sections that follow discuss, in turn, whether changes in acquisition policy 
and process have visible effects on PAUC growth, and the association between funding 
climates and PAUC growth.  
 Average PAUC Growth by Acquisition Regime and Funding Climate 
 
Any Trend in PAUC Growth? 
There is no doubt that direction from the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) 
changes particular MDAPs, and some of those changes reduce the risks of major PAUC 
growth or other program performance shortfalls. Viewed from this perspective, the question 
asked here is whether the decisions made (or not made) in different acquisition regimes are 
large enough and frequent enough to be visible in average PAUC growth. 
Looking first at the Relatively Accommodating climate (column on the right in Table 
3) and recognizing that it is likely that the average PAUC growth for FY 2003–FY 2007 
eventually will be a few percentage points higher,7 we can see no trend towards reduction in 
average PAUC growth in periods with a Relatively Accommodating funding climate. 
Statistical analysis is consistent with this impression; that is, we found no evidence of 
statistically significant differences among average PAUC growth rates for the Relatively 
Accommodating funding climate.8 
                                            
 
 
7 We have a PAUC growth estimate for 19 of the 25 MDAPs that passed MS B as ACAT I programs 
during 2003–2007 and which have not been cancelled or truncated. Of these 19 programs, six have 
been completed, six are in full rate production (FRP), three are in Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP), 
and four are in EMD. Younossi et al. (2007), in Is Weapon System Cost Growth Increasing?, found 
that on average, 60% of development cost growth occurs by five years after MS B. (31). Estimates of 
procurement cost growth also usually are increased as necessary to reflect EMD experience. Since 
each of the 19 programs is at least five years beyond MS B, even a doubling of the 7% average 
PAUC growth would be unexpected. 
 
8 The method used was one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). ANOVA is a test of whether three or 
more samples are drawn from populations with the same mean. The null hypothesis is that all 
population means are equal; the alternative hypothesis is that at least one mean is different. In this 
case, the alternative hypothesis was rejected at the 1% level. ANOVA assumes that (1) the 
populations from which the samples were drawn are normally distributed, (2) the samples are 
independent, and (3) the variances of the populations are equal. We are grateful to Dr. Sarah Burns 
for her advice on the statistical analysis and for doing the computations. 
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The average PAUC growth rates for the two most recent acquisition regimes during a 
Relatively Constrained funding (column on the left in Table 3) are noticeably larger than 
those for the three earlier periods. Again, however, the statistical analysis did not indicate 
that any of the averages is statistically different from the others at the 1% confidence level. 
Appendix C of McNicol and Wu (2014) presents a table similar to Table 3 for each of 
the Military Departments and for joint programs. None shows an improving trend in PAUC 
growth in either of the two funding climates, and with a small number of exceptions, these 
tables show the same features we see in Table 3.  
We have no fully comparable PAUC growth data for the periods before the DSARC 
was established. Consequently, the statistical analysis leaves open the possibility that the 
DSARC and its successors provided a useful discipline on acquisition programs.9 Moreover, 
the statistical analysis does not erase history. Weapon system cost growth was a particular 
concern during the 1980s—the sixth Carlucci Initiative was “Funding to Most Likely Costs”—
and it is reasonable to believe that the Carlucci Initiatives did in fact lead to more vigorous 
enforcement of realistic funding. We also know that less emphasis was placed on weapon 
system cost growth during the AR years, and oversight of acquisition programs was 
somewhat more relaxed. It could be that these differences do provide part of the explanation 
for the higher observed average PAUC growth during the AR years. The statistical analysis 
prevents us from asserting with confidence that they do, however, because those 
differences are within the bounds of what can be expected from the variability of the data.10  
It remains possible that factors that have not been considered in this paper mask 
significant influences of acquisition policy and process on PAUC growth that a more refined 
analysis would reveal.11 In considering this possibility, it must be kept in mind that the issue 
is growth in PAUC from the MS II/B baseline, not the trend over time in costs for a 
commodity group or the acquisition portfolio as a whole. Such trends, which may well exist, 
do not necessarily imply more cost growth for individual programs, as they should be 
                                            
 
 
9 The most nearly comparable data seem to be those in Table A-7 (pp. A-6 to A-8) of Appendix A of 
Tyson et al. (1992), The Effects of Management Initiatives, Vol. I: Main Report. These data are 
quantity adjusted, but for some programs cost growth may not be measured from the estimates at the 
start of EMD, and the sample may include programs that were cancelled. Omitting one program with 
an extremely high cost growth (Condor), the average PAUC growth for the pre-1970 MDAPs was 
48%, which is noticeably higher than the average PAUC growths during 1970–1978. 
 
10 For example, the exceptionally high average PAUC growth during the AR years (66%) can be 
attributed in part to changes in the program mix. During the AR years, four helicopter programs 
passed MS II/B, one more than average for a period of this length. Moving the helicopter program 
with the highest PAUC growth (H-1 Upgrades) from 1994–2000 to 1987–1989 reduces the average 
PAUC growth for the AR years from 66% to 61%, and increases the average for 1987–1989 from 
34% to 48%. 
 
11 Results of McNicol (2004) point to one possibility—changes in programs that occur after they pass 
MS II/B. This work considered growth in quantity normalized unit procurement costs after excluding 
costs of unforced changes in program content (i.e., changes not required to overcome some problem 
“baked into” the program in the MS II/B baseline). McNicol found evidence that some changes in the 
acquisition process had had a statistically significant effect on this measure of cost growth. See, in 
particular, pp. 43–44 and 55–56. 
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reflected in the MS II/B baselines. Further comments on possible confounding variables are 
made below. The conclusion offered here is that once we normalize for funding climate, we 
do not observe any improvement in PAUC growth from the changes made over the years in 
acquisition policy and process. 
Association of Funding Climate and PAUC Growth 
Returning to Table 3, the relevant comparisons are between the Relatively 
Constrained and Relatively Accommodating funding climates for a given acquisition regime. 
Whereas the effects on PAUC growth of the different acquisition regimes are elusive, those 
of the contrasting funding periods stand out sharply. 
We have only three experiments of changes in funding climate for a given acquisition 
regime, since two of the five acquisition regimes (DAB and AR) fall entirely within one 
funding climate—Relatively Constrained. Each of these three natural experiments on the 
effect of funding climate has the same outcome—passing MS II/B during a Relatively 
Constrained funding climate is on average associated with much higher PAUC growth 
compared to passing during a Relatively Accommodating funding climate for a given 
acquisition regime. The outcomes of the first two experiments are virtually identical—an 
average PAUC growth of 35% and 34%, respectively, in the two periods when the topline 
was Relatively Constrained and average PAUC growth of 11% and 13%, respectively, in the 
two periods when the topline was Relatively Accommodating. The effect seems most 
pronounced in the third experiment (DAB post-AR)—57% for FY 2001–FY 2002 and 7% for 
FY 2003–FY 2007. (As noted earlier, PAUC growth for the later period will increase 
somewhat as the programs of that period are completed; see footnote 8.) The statistical 
analysis found each of these differences to be significant at more than the 1% level.12  
There is a distinct pattern to the changes in funding climate over our sample period—
bust, boom, bust, boom. If some other factor or combination of factors is actually at work, 
rather than funding climate, it would have to have this same pattern. One possibility is that 
the methods used to estimate PAUC growth for MDAPs that passed MS II during FY 1989–
FY 2007 are not the same as the method used for those that passed MS II during FY 1970–
FY 1988. Appendix A of McNicol and Wu (2014) provides a comparison that suggests that 
differences in estimating methods do not explain the low average PAUC growth recorded for 
FY 2003–FY 2007 or the comparatively high cost growth observed for FY 1990–FY 2002. 
The obvious interpretation of Table 3, and the one we believe to be correct, is that it really is 
changes in funding climate at work. 
This does not mean that a Relatively Constrained funding climate causes PAUC 
growth. The proximate causes of PAUC growth are decisions embedded in programs 
approved at MS II/B (unrealistic cost estimates or programmatic assumptions, for example) 
and decisions made during program execution (such as failing to act promptly enough on 
test results) that eventually lead to PAUC growth. The correlation observed between higher 
PAUC growth and periods of tighter funding climate does suggest that programs are more 
likely to be burdened with such decisions if they passed MS II/B during a Relatively 
Constrained funding climate. 
                                            
 
 
12 In this case, we used the usual one-tail test for the difference between the means of samples 
drawn from what are assumed to be normal populations. 
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Is High PAUC Growth Systemic in the Relatively Constrained Funding 
Climate? 
Based on the analysis thus far, it would not be surprising to find that almost all 
programs that pass MS II/B during a period with a Relatively Constrained funding climate 
are burdened with the sorts of very optimistic programmatic and costing assumptions that 
tend to result in high PAUC growth. Alternatively, the bulk of the cost growth might be 
accounted for by a relatively small number of MDAPs. Which of these two cases is the more 
nearly accurate is relevant to the discussion of acquisition reform. In the first case, it is 
reasonable to assume that PAUC growth is a systemic problem. It is often said, for example, 
that the acquisition culture has a bias in favor of optimistic programmatic and cost 
assumptions. PAUC growth looks much less like a systemic problem with the acquisition 
process, however, if most of it is due to a small number of MDAPs. 
The first column of Table 4 shows the average PAUC growth (in periods of Relatively 
Constrained funding climate) of MDAPs that had a PAUC growth between zero and 50%. 
The average for these MDAPs was a PAUC growth of about 22%. The second column 
shows the average PAUC growth of those MDAPs that experienced a PAUC growth of at 
least 50%. These range from a low of 71% (FY 1970–FY 1980) to a high of 122% (FY 
1994–FY 2000). The average of these values is 94%. Finally, the last column in Table 4 
shows the percentage of PAUC growth in these periods accounted for by MDAPs with 
PAUC growth of at least 50%. The range is 62% to 89% and, averaged across all five 
periods, the high cost growth MDAPs accounted for just over three-quarters of total PAUC 
growth. (The figures shown in Table 4 are computed from simple averages rather than 
weighted by program size.13 ) In short, PAUC growth is mainly an affliction of Relatively 
Constrained funding climates and it is primarily due to a minority of programs—on the order 
of 37%—that experience PAUC growth of upwards of 50%.  
 Characteristics of PAUC Growth in Relatively Constrained Funding 
Climate 
 
                                            
 
 
13 Weighting by program size would be required in any consideration of the effect of PAUC growth on 
funding, because cost growth on a large program has a greater effect on funding requirements than 
cost growth of the same magnitude on a smaller program. This paper, however, is concerned with 
examining the extent to which PAUC growth is associated with particular combinations of acquisition 
regimes and funding climates and in such a context, each observation counts as much as any other. 
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Does the Resource Allocation Process Play a Major Role in PAUC Growth? 
This section turns to a discussion of MDAPs that experienced very high cost growth 
(interpreted as a PAUC growth of at least 50%) and MDAPs that experienced negative cost 
growth. Investigation of this topic was initially prompted by the prospect that instances of 
high cost growth and perhaps also of negative cost growth mask effects of acquisition policy 
and process on PAUC growth. The topic proves to be interesting for other reasons as well. 
First, it provides clear and unexpected evidence of the connection between PAUC growth 
and funding climate and, by implication, the DoD resource allocation process. Second, cost 
growth proves not to be a problem with the typical system but with the minority of MDAPs 
that experience very high cost growth. 
Negative PAUC Growth 
Twenty-nine MDAPs in our sample show negative PAUC growth (not including four 
cases of zero PAUC growth). Viewed from an acquisition perspective, negative PAUC 
growth seems anomalous; in fact, it is not uncommon to hear confident assertions to the 
effect that MDAPs never underrun their funding. It is understandable, however, in a resource 
allocation context at the Service level. 
Negative PAUC growth is recorded if the actual cost of a program proves to be less 
than the cost in the MS II/B baseline. Negative PAUC growth can occur because a program 
was particularly well managed or lucky. It also can occur if the ambitions of a program are 
scaled back after a program has passed MS II/B. In addition, negative PAUC growth can 
grow out of resource allocation imperatives.  
Assuming the program was funded to its MS II/B baseline, negative PAUC growth 
implies that over time funds can be taken from the program in question and reallocated to 
other applications, including other acquisition programs. The program, then, effectively can 
be used as a “bank”—a way to hold reserves in relative safety until they are needed. A 
“withdrawal” can be made in the execution year with the approval of the Congress, but for 
the outyears of the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), the Service can simply initiate the 
reallocation in its Program/Funding submission to the OSD.  
A bank of this sort is more likely to be needed in a Relatively Accommodating 
funding climate, as it can then serve as a way to delay final decisions on allocation of the 
higher level of funding that has become available. We would therefore expect to find 
relatively more instances of negative PAUC growth in the Relatively Accommodating funding 
periods, and this is what we observe. As the data in Table 5 indicate, about 30% of our 
observations in Relatively Accommodating funding climates are of negative PAUCs, 
compared to about 12% across the periods of Relatively Constrained climate. 
 Number of PAUC Growth Observations Less Than Zero by Acquisition 
Regime and Funding Climate 
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Negative PAUC growth is not regarded as a problem, probably correctly. It is, 
however, a clear and unexpected case in which PAUC growth reflects accommodation to 
the funding climate.  
PAUC Growth ≥ 50% 
Adoption of unrealistically low cost estimates at MS II/B creates the illusion that the 
funds available over the FYDP and beyond will support more MDAPs than they in fact will. 
That is, unrealistically optimistic costing will for a time permit more new starts.14 In addition, 
the conventional wisdom holds that a lower MS II/B cost makes it easier to gain the 
concurrence of the OSD, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Congress for a 
new program. Consequently, we would expect to find relatively more programs with PAUC 
growth of at least 50% in Relatively Constrained funding climates, which is in fact what we 
do find. 
Table 6 reports the number of programs with an average PAUC growth of at least 
50%. Of the 54 programs that passed MS II/B in a Relatively Accommodating funding 
climate, only four showed PAUC growth of at least 50%. In contrast, 36 of the 97 programs 
that passed MS II/B in a Relatively Constrained funding climate showed cost growth of at 
least 50%. This is to say that the frequency of MDAPs with a PAUC growth of at least 50% 
is much lower in periods when the topline is Relatively Accommodating than in a Relatively 
Constrained funding climate—7% versus 37%. 
 Number of PAUC Growth Observations ≥ 50% by Acquisition Regime 
and Funding Climate 
 
Reexamination of Trends in PAUC Growth 
The circumstances in which we are more likely to see very high PAUC growth and 
instances of negative PAUC growth suggest that they reflect accommodations to different 
funding climates. In other words, instances of high PAUC and negative PAUC may not 
reflect the normal operation of the acquisition process. On this basis, Table 7 presents 
average PAUC growths computed excluding observations of greater than or equal to 50% 
and negative values.  
The statistical analysis of the data in Table 7 produces the same conclusions as that 
of Table 3 in one important respect: there is no indication of statistically significant 
differences across acquisition regimes within a funding climate. The difference between the 
                                            
 
 
14 It is not clear that doing this ever makes financial sense because the “loans” created by 
unrealistically low cost estimates eventually must be made good one way or another at an implicit but 
steep interest rate. 
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averages in the two funding climates for the DAB post AR is, however, statistically significant 
at the 1% level, but the differences for the other two cases (DSARC and Post-Carlucci 
DSARC) are not statistically different at conventional levels of significance. 
 Average PAUC Growth Excluding Observations ≥ 50% and Negative 
Observations by Acquisition Regime and Funding Climate 
 
Implications for Discussions of Acquisition Reform 
This paper points to three implications for a discussion of acquisition reform. First, 
the relevant context for understanding PAUC growth is the interface between the acquisition 
process and the resource allocation process. The crucial evidence behind this point is the 
strong association between funding climate and PAUC growth. Resource managers must 
think in terms of a portfolio of programs across mission areas and commodity types, and 
extending from efforts in the technology base through programs nearing the end of 
production. When a program is completed, it opens a resource “hole” that programs 
emerging from EMD can occupy. In turn, programs earlier in the acquisition cycle can move 
forward as well. When funding for acquisition turns down, these holes get smaller, or close 
entirely, or require cuts in funding for ongoing programs. The alternatives available in this 
circumstance are all undesirable—cancellations of programs, delays in new starts, 
stretches, and unrealistic costing. The evidence summarized here suggests that it is in this 
context that high PAUC growth arises. 
Second, it seems unlikely that further changes in the acquisition process would have 
a major effect on PAUC growth. The research found no evidence that acquisition policy and 
process changes through the years have produced sustained and significantly lower or 
higher PAUC growth. This does not mean that the DAB process does not provide a useful 
discipline on acquisition programs; moreover, further changes in acquisition policy or 
process might be warranted for reasons of good government. The evidence does, at a 
minimum, suggest that the effects of changes in the acquisition process since its 
inauguration in the early 1970s have not had a dominant effect on PAUC growth. 
Third, it is difficult to see that the cultures of the DoD acquisition organizations are a 
crucial obstacle to improved performance on cost growth. The key point to note is that high 
PAUC growth is not persistent, but rather episodic, and correlated with environmental 
factors outside of the control of the acquisition process. There is remarkably little PAUC 
growth in periods when the funding is Relatively Accommodating. It seems fair to ask if it 
makes sense to assert that an entrenched culture sometimes results in high cost growth and 
other times in low cost growth. Just how is it that the A team takes the field so quickly and 
quietly when the budgetary sun comes out? And why even in bad budgetary weather do 
more than half of MDAPs exhibit comparatively modest PAUC growth? 
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